Ph.D. Research Proposal

Doctoral Program in Security Studies

<Ph.D. in Security Studies>

Ph.D. in Force Ratios and Relative Combat Power

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Abstract&Project Summary

The research project summary should provide an overview of your proposed research project that a non-specialist in the field will be able to understand. It will include the purpose and objectives of the project, why it is important that the issue be addressed and the expected results you hope to obtain.

**Keywords**

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**CHAPTER 1**

**Introduction**

Overview of study

Explanation of project background

Briefly focus on primary issues

Why worth to attention

Present: research statement form of hypothesis, goal statement or project statement

Rs:

* capture both essence and limitations of study
* follwed by clarification on the expected outcomes

Introduction: In the proposal introduction you should provide the following:

Research Questions: Explain the question/problem that the project intends to address to put the project in the proper context. You should develop a thesis statements that concisely sums up the question

Research approach: Explain in general the type of approach you will take and why

Significance: Explain why it is important to address the particular

Objectives: Briefly relate what you hope to accomplish through your research project

**CHAPTER 2**

**Literature Review**

**Solid knowledge on the hand**

**You have also established a cohorent and innovative view in sythesizing and integrating the primary aspects in the field, so that put into perspective the new directions that you are planning to explore.**

**Sun Tzu, Art of War III Offensive Strategy[[1]](#footnote-1)**

**Art of Offensive Strategy**

Sun Tzu refers to force ratios on the “Offensive Strategy” part of his book. He emphasizes to capture enemy’s army intact rather than destroying it (p.77, 2nd para). His famous and hard to achieve saying is “for to win 100 victories in 100 battle is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill (p.77, 3rd para).

By this way he adds the troops are not worn out. This is he terms as the “art of offensive strategy”. From this point he passes to force ratios;

* “When ten to the enemy’s one, surround him (p.79, 12rd para).
* When five times his strength, attack him (p.79, 13rd para).
* If double his strength, divide him (p.80, 14rd para).
* If equally matched you may engage him (p.80, 15rd para).
* If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing (p.80, 16rd para),
* And if in all respect’s unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for one more powerful (p.80, 17rd para).

**Clausewitz, On War** Book III, chapter VIII[[2]](#footnote-2)

* **Superiority of Numbers**,
* Clausewitz refers to “superiority of numbers” as a most common element in victory. According to him strategy decides; time, place, and the forces of the engagement. In is conceptualizing these three factors exert considerable influence on engagement’s outcome (p.194).
* He emphasizes that if purpose and circumstances of the engagement, and the fighting value of the troops is disregarded, then distinguishing factor in battle will be the “number of troops”. In this understanding he points that “numbers” will determine victory. He further adds that when taking into consideration of circumstances, “superior numbers” may actually be contributing very “little” (p.194).
* After this generalization, he further goes and asserts that if superiority reach the point where it is overwhelming, superiority of numbers will be the most important factor in the outcome of an engagement, so long as it is great enough to counterbalance all other contributing circumstances. As a result of this assertion he points out as a **“first principle of strategy”**: bringing as many troops as possible at the decisive point (p.194-195).
* His methodology on building this theory is “historical examples”. Without criticizing whether enough samples are used to make this generalization, I will only summarize that Clausewitz made Marathon as an exception of his assertion where three times strong Persians are defeated by Greeks[[3]](#footnote-3). Other than that, with examples from Frederick the Great and Napoleon, Clausewitz concludes that: even the most talented general will find it very difficult to defeat an opponent twice his strength. He says that “when we observe that the skill of the greatest commanders may be counterbalanced by a two-to-one ratio in the fighting forces, in ordinary cases, a significant superiority in numbers (it does not have to be more than double) will suffice to assure victory, however adverse the other circumstances”. (p.195). This is my understanding that contemporary doctrine takes the principle which says 3 times strong armies may assault.
* The most important factor is to achieve strength at the decisive point. And it depends on the strength of the army and on the skill with which this strength is employed. Consequently, the forces available must be employed with such skill that even in the absence of absolute superiority, relative superiority is attained at the decisive point. To achieve this, the calculation of space and time appears as the most essential factor. But he says that “although the “equation of time and space” does underlie everything else,
* He further asserts that “conventional jargon” does not allow us to assume “a skillful correlation of time and space explain every instance to beat several forces with a single army” as observed in Frederick the Great and Bonaparte (p.196-197). The true reasons for such victories according to him were the correct appraisal of the opposing generals, taking the risk to engage with inferior forces, energy for rapid movement, boldness for quick attacks, and the increased activity which danger generates in great men. He concludes that these are not related with time and space (p.197).
* Even the ricochet effect of forces to which great generals have frequently entrusted their defense, by which the victories of Rossbach and Montmirail gave impetus to those of Leuthen and Montereau, is, if we wish to be clear and accurate, rare in history. (p.197).
* Relative superiority, that is, the skillful concentration of superior strength at the decisive point, is much more frequently based on the correct appraisal of this decisive point, on suitable planning from the start; which leads to appropriate disposition of the forces, and on the resolution needed to sacrifice nonessentials for the sake of essentials-that is, the courage to retain the major part of one's forces united. This is particularly characteristic of Frederick the Great and Bonaparte. (p.197).
* Superiority of numbers must be regarded as fundamental-to be achieved in every case and to the fullest possible extent. (p.197).
* But it would be seriously misunderstanding our argument, to consider numerical superiority as indispensable to victory; we merely wished to stress the relative importance. The principle is served if we use the largest possible force; the question whether to avoid a fight for lack of strength can be decided only in the light of all other circumstances. (p.197).

Clausewitz refers to superiority of numbers to a condition. So if this condition is not met, which I will analyze in my research, then there must be something else, matters for the victory of the battle.

İf we apply here, marginal benefit concept of economy, increase in one area will not effect after certain point. So here, clausewitz argues that if we deploy overwhlmingly much force then you will guarentee the victory. But I will analyze, how this gradual force accumulation effects victory. Is it increasing as force increase or after some point in comes to stalemate, or it doesn’t effect after one point.

threefold activity of strategy victory lies with adept use of strategy not whole numbers. So deciding when, where, quantity, strategy effects the result. What clausewitz says is it is strategies job to accumulate as much as possible in order to make other factors not be effect. 3ten birine soyutlandığına, sayılar zaferi belirler. Stratejinin işi de diğer iki faktör ne olursa olsun stratejinin işi mümkün olduğunca fazla kuvveti yığmak zaferi garanti etmek diyor.

Angajmanı maksat ve koşul kaynaklı değişkenlerden soyutlarsan numbers determine victory.

Method: observation, deductions.

**Frederick William Lanchester**[[4]](#footnote-4), Aircraft in Warfare, the Dawn of the Fourth Arm

When we come to 1916, a fundamentally new treatment of subject come to the life.

* **Principle of concentration (Chapter 5):** 
  + As Clausewitz refers to bringing as many troops as possible to decisive point as 1st principle of Strategy, Lanchester similarly asserts that one of the great questions at the root of all strategy is that of “concentration”; concentration of all whole resources of belligerent on a single purpose or object, and concentration of the main strength of his forces, at one point in the field of operations (p.39). But unlike Clausewitz he refers to this principle as not of principle of strategy. He refers that concentration has two distinct sides namely moral and material, and material side of concentration has scientific character that is to be used in tactical operations (p.39). He analyses controlling factors of it with the sense of contrasting natures of conditions of ancient and modern warfare.
* **The Conditions of Ancient and Modern Warfare Contrasted:** 
  + According to him in ancient times no matter how much strength strategy brings to the theatre of operations, ultimately men will find only men to wield its weapon. Instead of this direct nature of olden times defence, he argues, defence of modern arms is indirect: enemy is prevented from killing you by your killing him first. “As a consequence of this difference, the importance of concentration in history has been by no means a constant quantity”. Under the old conditions it was not possible by any strategic plan or tactical maneuver to bring other than approximately equal numbers of men into the actual fighting line. Under the present-day conditions all this changed. With modern long-range weapons the concentration of superior numbers gives an immediate superiority in the active combatant ranks (p.40). Here he implies that concentration in old times rather difficult to achieve although it was not impossible.
  + In the ancient condition where man is opposed to man, and assuming the combatants to be of equal fighting value and conditions are equal, “duels” will make up the fight and there will be equal numbers killed (p.41).
* **Modern Conditions Investigated:**
  + In the modern conditions, with the same assumptions, each man will in a given time score, on an average, a certain number of hits that are effective, so, the number of men knocked out per unit time will be directly proportional to the numerical strength of the opposing force. He gives also mathematical equation of this like that (p.41).
  + He formulates this as:

**db/dt = -r x c**

**dr/dt = -b x k**

b: numerical strength of blue

r: numerical strength of red

t: time, c& k: fighting strengths or values

* **Weakness of a Divided Force:** 
  + He gives graphical explanation of “divided forces” weaknesses. He analyses situations and concludes that if a superior strategy compels one part to fight in two parts (p.43-46);
    - In a 1:1 force ratio, one could defeat the divided side,
    - In a 1:1 force ratio without division of forces battle would prolong,
    - In a 1: √2 superior force ratio, if inferior force divides superior one, the battle end with no winner.
* **Validity of Mathematical Treatment:**
  + After analyzing these force ratios, he further asserts that “the direct numerical comparison of the forces engaging in conflict is almost universal” (p.46). He further goes and asserts that “counting the pieces as of value, and to deny the more extended application of mathematical theory, is illogical and unintelligent.” (p.47)
* **Fighting Units not of Equal Strength:**
  + He made these force ratio analyses with the assumption of fighting values of two sides are equal. In mathematical terms c=k.
  + At this point he asserts that “this condition is not necessarily fulfilled if the combatants be unequally trained or of different morale or if their weapons are of unequal efficiency (p47).
  + He asserts that while we cannot judge on these two factors but we can calculate weapons efficiency (p47).
* **Influence of efficiency of weapons:**
  + He asserts that “any difference in the efficiency of weapons may be presented by a disparity in the constants c and k in equations”. With a Blue force of 500 that use rifle and lose 100 man would eventually be equal force of Red with 1000 man that use breech-loader gun with 200 casualties. Here we have different constants and Lanchester shows this again with mathematical equation (p.48).

Rate of reduction of Blue Force: db/dt = -Nr x c

Rate of reduction of Red Force: dr/dt = -Mb x k

M&N = representing the efficiency or value of an individual unit of Blue&Red Force

* + And for the condition of equality: (loses/total)

db/ dt \*1/b = dr/dt\*1/r --------> -N r / b = -M b / r -----------> **N r² = M b²**

* + He explains this formulation as “fighting strengths of the two forces are equal when the square of the numerical strength multiplied by the fighting value of the individual units are equal (p.48).
* **Outcome of this investigation: the n-square law**
  + Within this law he defines **the fighting strength of a force**: it is proportional to the square of its numerical strength multiplied by the fighting value of its individual units (p.48). Thus, he made conclusion of divided forces: sum of squares of two portions of the divided forces are for all values equal to the square of the other (not divided) force (p.48).
  + Let the numerical values of the blue and represented by b and r, then in a small interval of time the change in b and r is represented by db and dr of such relative magnitude that;  
    db/dr=r/b ----->db\*b = r\* dr
  + Change of area of b² is 2b\*db,

Change of area of r² is 2r\*dr which according to foregoing (1), are equal. Therefore, the difference between the two squares is constant. q represents the numerical value of the remainder of the blue force after annihilation of the red (p.49-50).

b²-r² = constant ------> b²-r²=q² ---------> b²=q²+r²

* + Example of this is an army of 50K giving battle in turn to two armies of 40K and 30K respectively, equally well armed; then the strengths are equal, since 50K²=40K²+30K². But if divided force fight in one part then the army of 50K will be overwhelmed (p.50).
* **Example involving weapons of different effective value:** 
  + He gave an example with this assumption: 1 man employing machine-gun can punish a target to the same extent in a given time as 16 riflemen. He analyzes number of men armed with machine-gun necessary to replace a battalion (1000 men strong) in the field?
  + From n-square law: **N r² = M b² -🡪 16\*r²=1\*1000²-🡪r²=√1000²/16 = 1000/4=250** or one quarter the number of the opposing force (p.50).
  + According to him this example exhibits at once the utility and weakness of the method. Basic assumption is that the fire of each force is definitely concentrated on the opposing force. Thus, the enemy will concentrate on the 1 machine-gun operator the fire that would otherwise be distributed over four riflemen. And so, on an average he will only last for one quarter the time, and at 16 times the efficiency during his short life he will only be able to do the work of 4 riflemen in lieu of 16 (p.51).
  + When, on the other hand, the circumstances are such to preclude the possibility of such concentration the value of the individual machine-gun operator becomes 16 riflemen. The same applies when he is opposed by shrapnel fire or any other weapon which is directed at a position rather than individual. So, he concludes that one might pay attention to these variations when assessing the theory (p.51). According to him these variations are less common in naval then in military warfare; the individual unit -the ship- is always the gunner’s mark. He points out that aircraft is more similar to navy ship (p.51).
* **The Hypothesis Varied-modifying initial hypothesis to harmonise with the conditions of long-range fire (p.51-52):** 
  + Assumption: fire concentrated on a certain area known to be held by the enemy, and take this area to be independent of the numerical value of the forces, then, with notation as before, we have;

-db/dt = b\*Nr\*constant

-dr/dt = r\*Mb\*constant ----->M db/dt = N dr/dt --->or the rate of loss is independent of the numbers engaged, and is directly as the efficiency of the weapons.

* Under these conditions the fighting strength of the forces is directly proportional to their numerical strength; there is no value in concentration, qua concentration, and the advantage of rapid fire is relatively great. This is more likely to ancient warfare.
* **An Unexpected Deduction (p.52):**
  + Better for numerically superior force to come to close quarters,
  + Blue force of 100 men with machine-gun vs red force of 1000 men with rifle
  + 1st assumption: both forces are spread over a front of given length at long range.
  + Red force loose 16 men to the blue force loss of 1 man. Red lose.
  + Red close and each individual have mark, red lose half to come closer, **but 600²\*1>100²\*16**
* **Examples from history (p.53):**
  + Principle: on the field of battle concentration matter of the most vital importance.
  + Attacking of opposing force before concentration gained: defeat of Napoleon in Italy campaign.

**Chapter 3 Research Objectives and Methodology**

Detailed account of how you intend to conduct your research.

Discuss equipment, tools, techniques and anything else that will be used in conducting project.

You won’t be expected to know precisely everything involved but you will need to demonstrate that you have given it serious thought.

**Chapter 4 Current Work & Initial Results**

**Chapter 5 Work Plan and Potential Implications**

outline of your proposed time frame with specific targets at certain intervals.

Make sure your proposed time frame fits within the programs schedule to complete a PhD.

This section isn’t always required or may be combined with the methodology section. Check with specific programs for their requirements.

**Chapter 6 Conclusion**

**References**

Bibliography: This is a page of all references that you have used, will use or think you might use in your research project including the literature review. The bibliography will be used to determine if you have a good background in the relevant literature and haven’t overlooked an important source. Use the citation style appropriate for your particular field.

1. TZU, Sun. The Art of War, Translated and with an Introduction by Samuel B.Griffith, Oxford University Press. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. History Channel, 2006, A&E Television Networks, Decisive Battles-Battle of Marathon: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V3b6M5CzYTE>, 16 January 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Aircraft in Warfare, F.W.Lanchester, London, 1916. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)